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Recent Decisions
CIVIL PROCEDURE - FELA - STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS SUSPENDED
BY DEFENDANT'S VISREPRESENTATION
Plaintiff filed suit against his employer in May 1957, as a result of
an industrial disease allegedly contracted while he was employed by
defendant in 1952.' The action was brought under the Federal Em-
ployer's Liability Act (FELA), which provides that "no action shall be
maintained under this Act unless commenced within three years from
the time the cause of action accrued."3  Defendant entered a motion to
dismiss on the ground that the statutory time in which to bring the
action had passed and that plaintiff had thereby lost his cause of action.
Plaintiff contended that he had been induced to delay bringing suit
by defendant's agents who misrepresented the time within which he
could sue. The agents allegedly told him he had seven years rather than
three. Plaintiff contended that defendant should be estopped from
pleading the statute of limitations.
Defendant maintained that the alleged misrepresentations were not
grounds for estoppel. He further contended that these misrepresenta-
tions were as to a matter of law and that plaintiff was thus not entitled
to rely upon them.4
The district court, while admitting that plaintiff's contentions were
persuasive, was unwilling to depart from the established rule in the
Second Circuit; viz., that fraud or misrepresentation by defendant could
not suspend the statute of limitations contained in the FELA.' The
motion to dismiss was allowed.' The court of appeals affirmed per
curiam, saying that they would ". . . not attempt to retrace (their) foot-
steps now, but may well await resolution of the conflict by the Supreme
Court." The Supreme Court granted certiorari and unanimously re-
versed the decision of the lower courts.'
1. Glus v. Brooklyn E. Dist. Terminal, 359 U.S. 231 (1959), reversing 253 F.2d 957 (2d
Cit. 1958), affirming 154 F. Supp. 863 (S.D.N.Y. 1957).
2. 35 Star. 65 (1908), 45 U.S.C. §§ 51-60 (1952).
3. 35 Stat. 65 (1908), 45 U.S.C. § 56 (1952).
4. The Supreme Court refused to rule as a matter of law that plaintiff could not rely on
representations as to opinions of law. Without amplification the Court said that special dr-
cumstances may enable one to rely upon such representations. Whether such circumstances
were present in this case was a matter for the trial court. 359 U.S. 231, 235 (1959).
5. Sgambati v. United States, 172 F.2d 297 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 337 U.S. 938 (1949);
Osbourne v. United States, 164 F.2d 767 (2d Cit. 1947) (dictum).
6. Glus v. Brooklyn E. Dist. Terminal, 154 F. Supp. 863 (S.D.N.Y. 1957).
7. Glus v. Brooklyn E. Dist. Terminal, 253 F.2d 957, 958 (2d Cir. 1958). The conflict
mentioned here is between the indicated Second Circuit rule and cases to the contrary such as
Toran v. New York, N.H., & H.R.R., 108 F. Supp. 564 (D. Mass. 1952).
8. 359 U.S. 231 (1959).
RECENT DECISIONS
The problem of whether the equitable doctrine of estoppel is applica-
ble as a bar to the defense of the statute of limtations has long involved
a rather technical distinction. When a general statute of limitations has
been enacted to restrict a common-law cause of action, the limitation is
said to be upon the liability and therefore, can be suspended in proper
instances. The defendant may be estopped from pleading such a remedial
limitation when he has caused the delay by fraudulent concealment or
misrepresentation. However, a different result has been reached when
the statute of limitations has been created in conjunction with the statu-
tory establishment of a new cause of action. This type of limitation has
been considered to be substantive and, consequently, has been said to
limit the right as well as the liability. The courts have generally held
that the substantive limitation must be strictly applied.1" Filing within
the period prescribed by the statute is considered to be a condition prece-
dent to the cause of action. When a case is brought after that period has
passed, the condition has not been met and the cause of action fails.1
In effect, the courts have allowed the defendant to thwart an otherwise
valid claim by delaying tactics because the plaintiff is unfortunate enough
to find his remedy in a statute containing a substantive statute of limita-
tions.'
While a majority of courts have maintained the distinction between
substantive and remedial statutes of limitations,3 several cracks have
appeared in the wall of protection which the courts have thrown up
around the substantive type. For example, in Osbourne v. United
States,"'4 the court allowed the suspension of such a limitation when plain-
tiff had been a prisoner of war, stating that both his rights and remedies
had been suspended thereby. It is interesting to note, however, that the
dictum in that case supported the general rule that fraud will not toll
substantive statutes of limitations.
In FELA cases, strict compliance with the time limitation for bring-
ing the action has generally been required.'5 However, in these cases also,
9. Schroder v. Young, 161 U.S. 334 (1895).
10. United States ex rel. Nitkey v. Dawes, 151 F.2d 639 (7th Cir. 1945), cert. denied, 327
U.S. 788 (1946); Pollen v. Ford Instrument Co., 108 F.2d 762 (2d Cir. 1940); Bell v. Wa-
bash Ry., 58 F.2d 569 (8th Cir. 1932).
11. Adams v. Albany, 80 F. Supp. 876 (S.D. Cal. 1948); Thompson v. Taylor, 62 F. Supp.
930 (S.D. Fla. 1945).
12. At least one court has felt that plaintiff is not completely without a remedy. It has been
suggested that he can sue for damages for the loss of his cause of action because of defendant's
fraud. Desmaris v. People's Gaslight Co., 79 N.H. 195, 107 Ad. 491 (1919) (dictum).
13. Annot., 24 A.L.R.2d 1420 (1952); Annot., 15 A.L.R.2d 500 (1951).
14. 164 F.2d 767 (2d Cir. 1947). This case was brought under the Suits in Admiralty Act,
41 Star. 526 (1932); 46 U.S.C. § 745 (1958), which contains a substantive statute of lim-
itations.
15. Damiano v. Pennsylvania R.R., 161 F.2d 534 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 232 U.S. 762
(1947); Bell v. Wabash Ry., 58 F.2d 569 (8th Cir. 1932).
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